There is a myth created and perpetuated by the right that the media lost Vietnam - that the media was critical of the war effort and that this caused the public to stop supporting it. This is false. The media was consistently pro-war until the public turned against it. What turned the public against it? Word of mouth from soldiers returning home.



The same thing is happening now. I think the phenomenon that Josh is noting is merely the tipping point resulting from soldiers telling their friends and relatives what's going on over there.

And then John Conyers deserves a round of applause for not allowing the Downing Street Memo and all it represents to leave the public consciousness.

This post will not include the words “left,” “right,” “Democrat” or “Republican,” so those of us who suck incessantly at the partisan teat are probably at a loss to understand why we have indeed reached a tipping point.

What goes around comes around, with or without the help of Bobo Kerry, Dr. Frist, Howeird Dean or Screamin’ Sean Hannity.  That was true of the Vietnam War and it is now true of the Iraq War.

Back in 1968, I was tearing out what little hair I had over the seeming obliviousness of the American people to the Johnson administration’s lies and deceits.  By 1970, I was covering the war and the folks back home finally had had enough.  Too many lies and deceits.  But most importantly, way too many flag-draped pine boxes.

It’s happening again, little thanks to the MSM or political “system.” 

to borrow a term from the right, as well as a growing number of Americans who at one time grudingly accepted large piles of B.S. so long as it served what they believed was "the greater good" who are now getting tired of the taste.

Over the past two years, any politician (or citizen, for that matter), who spoke out against the war were labeled as "un-American" or accused of "not supporting the troops." This made the issue pretty much "untouchable," especially during the U.S. election.

Then there were the Iraqi elections, and pessimism was met with "what a great victory for democracy this was." We had turned yet another corner and the entire region was on the verge of following suit. We now see that the administration's glowing optimism may have been a tad hasty, to say the least.

But anyway, to the "trickle down."

After a brief bout of demoralization following the U.S. election, Democrats started to speak out. It started with the usual suspects (the Deans, the Conyers, the Boxers, etc), and then Reid managed to, little by little, bring a unified voice to the party. Democrats in Congress, particularly in the Senate, began standing up to the bullies. They kept silent yet didn't fall into the Schaivo trap, they have kept firm in support of Social Security, they held firm (arguably) on the filibuster, and now, especially in light of new evidence (or at the least, grim reminders) of how we got into Iraq, Demcrats now feel more comfortable in venting and discussing an issue that many have felt silenced on for more than two years.

The muzzle is off and the dogs are pissed that they had to wear the thing for so long. Now we're starting to gnaw at the chain.

steve, actually, the "wounded" number is much higher. There are thousands (it's been a while since i've checked the numbers) who have been sent home with "physical or mental breakdowns."

That's right... to put down the insurgency, counting appropriate troop rotation rates, we need to increase the pool of troops available specifically for Iraq duty to 2.5 MILLION TROOPS.

"...It turns out that the number of "world policemen" required is roughly proportional to the size of the population being protected or controlled. At the low end of the scale is the proportion of police officers required for day-to-day law enforcement duties among generally peaceful populations such as those in the United States. Peaceful populations require force ratios of somewhere between one and four police officers per thousand residents. The United States as a whole has about 2.3 sworn police officers per thousand residents. Larger cities tend to have higher ratios of police to population. For cases drastic enough to warrant outside intervention, the required force ratio is much higher. Although numbers alone do not constitute a security strategy, successful strategies for population security and control have required force ratios either as large as or larger than 20 security personnel (troops and police combined) per thousand inhabitants. This figure is roughly 10 times the ratio required for simple policing of a tranquil population.
The British are acknowledged as the most experienced practitioners of the stabilization art. To maintain stability in Northern Ireland, the British deployed a security force (consisting of British army troops plus police from the Royal Ulster Constabulary) at a ratio of about 20 per thousand inhabitants. This is about the same force ratio that the British deployed during the Malayan counterinsurgency in the middle of the 20th century.
More recently, successful multinational operations have used initial force ratios as large as the British examples or larger. In its initial entry into Bosnia in 1995, the NATO Implementation Force brought in multinational forces corresponding to more than 20 soldiers per thousand inhabitants. After five years, the successor Stabilization Force finally fell below 10 per thousand. Operations in Kosovo during 2000 showed the same pattern; the initial forces were sized at somewhat above 20 per thousand.

These population-driven force ratios yield a number of daunting implications both for the size of the force itself and for the prospect of maintaining such a force over time. To begin with, stability operations usually take long periods of time to succeed. The proportionally large British forces operated for more than 25 years in Northern Ireland and for more than a decade in Malaysia (from 1948 to 1960). The operation in Bosnia is now in its eighth year.
The rotating deployments of troops over time cause complications across the military forces. In Northern Ireland, the British have limited the tour of duty for most troops to about six months. The six month tour has become standard in most militaries for peacekeeping deployments to places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sinai. The British have tried to keep the time between deployments at about 24 months or more. In professional militaries where soldiers remain in service for years at a time, therefore, five troops would be required for every one deployed at any given time. If a stabilization effort cannot adhere to this so-called "rule of five," then either the deployment time must be longer than six months or the time between deployments must be shorter than 24 months.
The population of Iraq today is nearly 25 million. That population would require 500,000 foreign troops on the ground to meet a standard of 20 troops per thousand residents. This number is more than three times the number of foreign troops now deployed to Iraq (see figure). For a sustainable stabilization force on a 24-month rotation cycle, the international community would need to draw on a troop base of 2.5 million troops. "

http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2003/bur
den.html

I'm sure you're correct. I chose to use figures provided by icasualties.org to avoid accusations of inflation. It seems they make a concerted effort at accuracy and religiously update and source what they publish.

In wars I can't imagine that politics of war just 'has' a tipping point against it.  The real political tipping point comes about only when political mobilization reaches the point of making the manifest opposition into a real force.  There does seem to be something of a potential threshold, an opportunity  for those opposed to this war to finally build and push for certain developments that in turn, could make a difference.

    One poster recently put it well.  He said you could go set yourself on fire on the White House steps and they'd just hose it down and go on to their afternoon bombing.  Congress passing or proposing some resolution is only a potential start of the ball rolling, and the notion of a tipping point having been reached at this point is whistling past the graveyard.

Elsewhere on this site I have repeatedly pointed out that the peace movement, which has not seen the resurgence many predicted would happen after the 2004 elections ended, even with the DSM I and II memos, needs a strategy and doesn't really have one.  It's basically been rounding up the usual suspects for almost two years.  If anyone thinks that any portion of the three-pronged strategy I have proposed is worth pursuing, please email me: cloudythescribbler@yahoo.com

Here, again, is the link to the 3-pronged thing. (1) A national group opposed to the Iraq War and militarism ("PeaceAmerica or something) canvassing door-to-door like Greenpeace does for donations and members, and mobilizing the members like ACORN type groups do; (2) a call, linked to "PeaceAmerica" -- as well as international groups like PeaceUK and PaixLaFrance, for a Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Iraq; (3) a Congressional Peace Caucus, like the Progressive Caucus or the Black Caucus, with the hard core of anti-imperialists, not just those who might support this and oppose that.

     Here's the link.  Please take the time to slog through it if you haven't already:
http://www.tpmcafe.com/comments/2005/6/14/102544/133/44#44 

Could the Dems have a hand in pulling out of Iraq, and maybe score some transient credit?  Sure.  But I suspect that, whoever manages it, our withdrawal will be surrounded by the same sort of self-deceptive bullshit and gas that got us into the debacle. 

I suspect that, from a purely political perspective, any type of pullout will be spun as a victory for Bush et al.  After all - they will be able to claim credit for bringing our heroic men and women home from battle.  It would be "Mission Accomplished" all over again.  Unfortunately, just as actual casualty rates increased after the first "Mission Accomplished" claim - we just might see the same pattern again.